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Protest: A Forensic Concept
L. Michael Kosanovich
Today's police administrators need administrative policy statements
that can be easily followed by individual officers in reacting to civil dis-
orders.' Historical analysis reveals a system in which the police have
deepened racial divisions in the United States by failing to cope with
problems in ghetto areas. Employing careless policies, sometimes initi-
ated by the police chief and other times initiated by the individual
officer, the police have shown weaknesses in two major areas. First, the
police have no established procedures to follow when civil disturbances
erupt. Second, the police have over-reacted to civil disturbances,
apparently manifesting anti-black fury by means of discriminatory
police behavior. As a result, the police of this century have had little
success in preventing racial unrest from escalating into racial riots.
Through a view of the history of riots, this study reveals the police as:
1) an unorganized, ill-trained mass operating under policies that prove
unworkable when confronted with civil disturbances; and 2) an organi-
zation that consciously socializes its members in an aura of discrimina-
tory attitudes and beliefs toward blacks.
A study of seven historical riot studies shows that not only have police
departments overlooked the adoption of workable policies that could en-
able more effective management of riot situations in their infancy, but
that the police have been closely associated with the beginnings of such
situations. In East St. Louis (1917), Chicago (1919), Washington
(1919), Harlem (1943), Detroit (1943), Detroit (1967), and Wash-
ington (1967), the unprofessional actions taken towards the black com-
munity by the police had much to do with turning initial incidents into
full-scale riots. It seems the absence of firm neutrality in the official
possessors of legitimate violence often provided the final spark for
many riots during a long period of U.S. history.
L. Michael Kosanovich is a senior in Forensic Studies, Indiana University, Bloomington,
Indiana.
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EARLY RIOTS:
East St. Louis-1917
The attackers in the 1917 outbreak in East St. Louis, Illinois, com-
mitted acts of barbarity and savagery unmatched in other race riots,
for East St. Louis represents the early twentieth century's peak of
anti-Negro violence and brutality)
Years of lawlessness had at last born bloody results. The proceedings
that set the stage for this serious July riot began several days earlier when
the city's labor leaders addressed a group of citizens at a City Council
meeting concerning further migration of blacks. They argued that
further migration of blacks would jeopardize job security. As the meet-
ing closed, a rumor was circulated by the throng that a black had shot
a white man in a hold up. The crowd soon lost control and began to
physically attack any blacks caught in the wake. Brutal anti-black
action resulted and was the first in a long line of incidents in which dis-
criminatory attitudes and values have been released by the local police
agency upon black inhabitants of the ghetto.
The account of how the police managed their role in the riot is pre-
sented in the report of a Special House Committee investigating the
causes of the riot. It was found that the police department and city
officials were indeed involved in the corruption that had infiltrated all
portions of local government in East St. Louis. Further, no policy had
been established to handle a riot-type situation at that time.
Indeed, the response on the part of police during the riot can best be
characterized by the Committee's evaluation of the police department.
When the lawlessness assumed serious proportions on July 2, the police
could have quelled and dispersed the crowds, then made up of small
groups. Instead, they either fled into the safety of cowardly seclusion or
listlessly watched the depredations of the mob, passively and in many
instances actively sharing in its work.' In one instance when the police
joined in on the wholesale slaughter of blacks, the Committee notes:
"The police shot into a crowd of Negroes who were huddled together,
making no resistance. It was a particularly cowardly exhibition of
savagery." 4
In short, the situation in East St. Louis was deplorable. The police
worsened a racially -tense situation by overaction in some instances and
not enough action in others.
Then, too, the police force was greatly understaffed. In a city of
seventy thousand inhabitants, the police agency was clearly understaffed,
with thirty-six patrolmen and sixteen plainclothesmen. Of these fifty-
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two members, six were blacks and nearly all of these officers received
orders to go home on July 2.
The combination of three elements: 1) police instigating racially-
tense situations, 2) a police force totally inept at performing competent
police work, and 3) a police force severely understaffed and lacking
good supervision, personifies police response to the riot. Police clearly
could have made no other response because of the character of the
force and its supervision. No statement of policy was initiated from the
department's chief to his suborinates in conjunction with the suppression
of the riot. Therefore, the individual officer acted out his role as he
perceived it. Hence, the entire organized force in East St. Louis was
unable to cope with the riot situation.
Washington Riot-1919
What an official of the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People (NAACP) called the "Red Summer" of 1919, began
early in the year and ended late. Relations between the races had been
put to a test in the Nation's Capitol during the time preceding the D.C.
riot by several situations involving labor inequality and newspaper
excesses.
The culmination of tensions resulted when the wife of a naval aviator
was attacked by two black males. For several nights skirmishes erupted.
Attempts by the NAACP to settle the situation with the District Com-
missioners and the Chief of Police apparently failed. Though pleas
were made by both city officials and civil right leaders concerning the
violence, they apparently went unheard. Nightly violence continued as
did arrests of blacks by police. The riot was renewed and not quelled
until federal troops saturated the city one day later.
Verbal and printed debate concerning just what role the police should
play resulted. Many newspapers and prominent Washingtonians ad-
vocated a law and order strong police force start. Most blacks and
some whites, on the other hand, called for a neutral police.
Two important factors emerged from the D.C. riot. First, the Wash-
ington riot indicated the blacks readiness to fight back on their own
when the police would not protect them. Second, an obvious double
standard of justice existed for whites and blacks.
Regarding readiness to fight, the Washington riot showed the first
traces of what we today consider sniping (armed resistance) to real or
imagined police harassment tactics. It was the initial riot in which blacks
took up arms and mounted an offensive to guard their lives, homes, and
rights. Black newspaper articles stated the obligation of a "New Negro"
to racist America as: "These outbreaks of the mob in Washington and
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Chicago have taught it one thing which it will not soon forget: That
the Negro means to be merciless in repelling attacks upon him by the
attackers. The New Negro, unlike the old-time Negro, does not fear the
white man and will learn in time that he has in this new type of Negro
a foeman worthy of steel."'
The second factor refers to an alternative to these self-defense tactics
taken by blacks. This alternative postulated a neutrality in police en-
forcement, thus treating blacks and whites alike. It seems negligence on
the part of the police in adopting such a policy before the riot played
a large role in the disturbance. Arrest records produced from the police
department indicate a higher rate of lawbreaking by blacks. But in
thorough scrutiny, these records must not be placed beyond reproach
because, as we have observed, blacks were arrested even for the most
minor offenses. So strict was the policy on their arrest in Washington,
that it led directly to the second night of rioting.
As a direct result of these two factors, we see another example of
police creating wider racial divisions between themselves and the ghetto
population. Further, the Washington riot is another example of deficient
policy planning, coupled with biased and discriminatory police tactics
by individual officers, leading to, rather than preventing race riots. The
police did not quell this riot in its beginning stages and did not decrease
the likelihood of future riots.
Chicago-1919
The so-called race riots in Chicago during the last week of July, 1919,
started on a Sunday at a bathing beach. A black boy drifted across an
imaginary line of segregation. Young white instigators began throwing
rocks at him. The incident resulted in the boy being knocked off of the
raft and in his eventual drowning. Blacks rushed to a policeman and
asked for the arrest of the rock-throwing white boys. The policeman
refused.6 As the body was brought to shore, more rocks were thrown
by blacks and caucasions alike. The policeman held to his refusal to
make arrests.! As a result of this incident, fighting began to spread to
the Black Belt, the densely populated area of Chicago.
During the next hours, atrocities to the black population in Chicago
were multiplied by the ineffectiveness of the police to make any just
response to the situation. Pictures taken by photographers revealed that
white mobs chased and sometimes beat blacks to death in the midst of
police officers. Blacks distrust of the police understandably increased.
A Joint Committee from the Union League Club and the Urban League
petitioned the Chief of Police to bring charges against the policeman
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who had refused to make the arrest of the white man on the beach that
fateful Sunday afternoon.
On the theory that knowledge of police neutrality would help calm
the city, the Joint Committee asked for a public announcement of these
measures.' The Chicago police did not comply. After the riot, State
Attorney Hayne said before the Investigation Committee:
There is no doubt that a great many police officers were grossly unfair
in making arrests. They shut their eyes to offenses committed by white
men while they were very vigorous in getting all the colored men
they could get.'
Again, public opinion about the role of the police varied. The first
response by newspaper editors in Chicago was vastly in favor of more
police strength in such matters. The police should have been stronger,
should have acted sooner, and should have acted with more severity.
The first reaction against this viewpoint came a full month later, when
the Daily News called the request by the grand jury for an additional
1,000 police a "curious error." The News argued that a well-directed,
efficient, and honest police department would not need more men to
deal with riots, whereas a demoralized, political-ridden force would
merely fatten on the spoils of another 1,000 jobs.'o
Two principal observations resulted from these occurrences. One
asserted the only way to solve the problems was to strengthen or im-
partialize the police. The other looked further into the problem of the
disorder, viewing it was a product of the social and economic structure
that the black was forced to cope with in Chicago.
Two investigatory groups- a grand jury and a Chicago Commission
-came to similar conclusions in their studies concerning the Chicago
Police Department. The grand jury reported "the failure of the police
to arrest impartially at the time of rioting, whether from insufficient
effort or otherwise, was a mistake and had a tendency to further incite
and aggravate the colored population." The grand jury also recom-
mended that, "There should be organization of the force for riot work
for the purpose of controlling rioting in its incipient stages."" Working
independently, the Chicago Commission prepared a list of nine recom-
mendations to be used by the department to avoid such explosive situa-
tions in the future.
Unfortunately, though the Chicago Commission provided a thorough
investigation of the riot, it soon became an organization orientated
toward the study and invention, but not implementation of new policy.
In evaluating the Commission's success with implementing its recom-
mendations, Waskow comments, "to the extent that its recommenda-
tions were adopted, the Commission would not fare well.""
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RECENT RIOTS
Few major racial incidents occurred during the twenty-four year
period following these early racial conflicts. Blacks seemed willing to
give local police agencies another try at restoring their decayed systems.
Then, two unfortunate incidents occurred in 1943 that brought back the
sad memories of a time most Americans wished to forget. Few efforts
had been made to clean up areas and produce workable reforms con-
cerning police practices in the ghetto area. Therefore, the gap con-
cerning racial division was enlarged due to police overlooking the real
and apparent danger of episodes like those that occurred in the early
1900's. Though white America tried to forget, there were persons who
could not overlook the growing problems in the ghetto-the ghetto
dwellers themselves.
Harlem Riot-1943
This riot situation was quelled with some degree of success. It sub-
stantiates the theory that through workable policies handed down by a
department's hierarchy and known to the men before the actual incident
occurs, a riot can be successfully negated.
The riot began when a black soldier was shot for not obeying a police
officer's command to halt.' As rumor spread through Harlem that a
black soldier had been shot in the back by a white policeman, Mayor
LaGuardia and Police Commissioner Valentine immediately took steps
to quell the riot. A few minutes after hearing the news, the Mayor and
the Commissioner were on the scene and remained there to guide the
riot procedures until the end. By utilizing both blacks and whites, the
M0ayor and Commissioner effectively quieted the disturbance, as White
notes in several interviews conducted afterwards, "They were out to do
a job of restoring order, and it was all in a day's work." Peace re-
turned to Harlem in a matter of hours.
This endeavor was one of the first to channel police strength to quell
a disturbance in its infant stages. Accurate steps were taken in quick
succession and policies were given from above with these men leading
the wax' in their administration. Strangely enough, this policy formu-
lated in Harlem was not utilized at Detroit in 1943.
Detroit Riot-1943
Racial unrest in 1942 paved the way for a serious fight that occurred
on a hot Sunday afternoon at Detroit's Belle Isle Amusement Park.
Though a disturbance of some sort had long been anticipated, police
reaction to this and similar incidents ran true-to-form. Anxiety reached
riot proportions because the police again enforced the law with an un-
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equal hand." As police poured in heavy reinforcements to control the
disturbance, hatred and distrust between the police and blacks were
prevalent everywhere. While police used night sticks, riot guns, and
revolvers against blacks, they used "persuasion" rather than decisive
action in response to white rioters. Though black rioters numbered in
the hundreds and whites in the thousands, seventeen blacks were killed
by police. Not a single white died. Of 1,300 persons arrested by the police
over 85o were blacks." Newspaper accounts document well this brutal
action of law enforcement officers toward blacks.
A Presidential proclamation brought in the United States Army and
established an armed truce between Negroes and Caucasians in Detroit.
The presence of troops maintained almost complete order and, within
the week, Detroit went back to its wartime pattern of life." Racial
hostilities, however, remained for yet another disturbance.
An evaluation of policies shows Police Commissioner Witherspoon
instructed his officers to apply a "kid's glove" policy in handling the
situation. However, he never specified to whom his "kid's gloves" policy
was applicable.
The various commissions that were established highlighted the great
bias the riot characterized. They used the opportunity to discredit black
youths who were supposedly agitated by such organizations as the
NAACP. They asserted there was no need for a grand jury investiga-
tion, when in fact it was the last thing that city and state officials or the
police wanted. This line of action leads one to believe that if an investi-
gation had been conducted, even more gross misconduct on the part of
the Detroit Police might well have been discovered. The conclusion
reached by most of these reports placed blame for the entire event upon
the black community. As we have seen, such conclusions are highly
questionable.
Detroit Riot-1967
The Detroit riot of 1967 seems to be described accurately by the jour-
nalist who wrote:
" . . whole sections of the nation's fifth largest city lay in charred,
smoking ruins. From Gratiot Avenue six miles to the east, tongues
of flames licked at the night sky, illuminating the angular skeletons of
gutted homes, shops, supermarkets. Looters and arsonists danced in
the eerie shadows, stripping a store clean, then setting . it to the
torch."'9
The Detroit Riot of 1967 began when a decision was made to make a
police raid in the midst of the ghetto. It was early Sunday morning-a
time when the police force is at its weakest and the streets are filled with
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the resentful, the alienated, the don't-give-a-damn-for-anything, resi-
dents.20 If Machiavelli had wanted to provoke a confrontation between
the police and the blacks, he couldn't have chosen a better time and
place than Twelfth Street on that Sunday morning.2 A "blind pig" (an
illegal tavern) had been raided, and large numbers of its occupants,
both drunk and sober, marched into the street. Many were arrested. As
a belligerent crowd, made largely of persons described above, gathered
at the scene, the first bottle or stone was thrown. A rumor, perhaps
based on fact, that the police had abused a black woman at the "blind
pig" incident, circulated throughout the ghetto. As a result, Detroit be-
came the scene of the bloodiest uprising in a half century and the cost-
liest in terms of property damage in the history of the United States.2 2
When police failed to interfere, the looting spread."
The precipitating incidents of this riot were many: a survey con-
ducted by a University of Michigan psychologist accurately described
the real concerns of the black populations; a number of unaccounted for
killings occurred in the city; rumors ran rampant; when the riot did
ensue, the police chief's "walk soft" policy for police conduct was suf-
ficiently vague to be ineffective.
It was hoped that a strict policy of observation and containment would
quell the riot. But finally on a Sunday afternoon, the Mayor called for
additional forces. Until then, there had been hope that as the people
blew off steam the riot would stop." Later that evening he issued a
message instituting a 9:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. curfew. At 9:07 p.m., the
first incident of large scale sniper fire was reported.2 5 Rumors incited
skirmishes, and shooting intensified when the National Guard and state
troopers were called. It seems as conditions grew worse, (more sniping,
looting), the police commissioner and the Mayor renegotiated their
position and gave orders for police to start shooting and use neces-
sary force to quell the riot. As it turned out, this change of policy served
only to further strain the racially-tense situation which the police had
been major participants in initiating.
In short, what happened has become the legacy of the police depart-
ment of Detroit. Seared in the memory of Detroit's black population was
this breakdown of law and order-a police department unable to con-
trol its own men and pretending otherwise.2" In the space of some
twenty -four years between riots in Detroit, little had been accomplished.
The three policies formulated to quell the riot were the "walk soft"
policy, the use of weaponry policy, and "Operation Sundown". Each
failed miserably. The "walk soft" policy, had been formulated in ad-
vance and broadcasted down to subordinates. At the riot's inception,
police "assumed" it was in effect. However, the policy proved grossly
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ineffective. The tactics were not tested thoroughly in the field before
the riot occurred. The weaponry policy was, of course, a rerun of the
Detroit Riot of 1943. Local authorities made the same mistake. As
Mayor Cavanaugh later admitted, "our police weren't ordered to shoot
or not to shoot. They were supposed to use their judgment."" When
specific orders are not sent down from superior to subordinate concerning
when a service weapon is or is not to be used, the local authorities are
leaving themselves open for a blood bath. This is exactly what happened
in Detroit for the second time ina span of twenty-four years. "Opera-
tion Sundown," a plan to coordinate the National Guard, State Police
and Detroit Police, apparently was never implemented. The National
Guard was at least as ineffective as the police, because of this error in
policy formation.
As a result, the Detroit Police Department acted with little team
effort during this riot. Various officers took the law into their own
hands and inacted their own forms of retribution upon Detroit blacks.
The officers simply manifested their highly biased and discriminatory
attitudes. The various police policies proved unworkable, unleashing
a disorganized mass on the ghetto dwellers to inflict enormous losses.
Washington Riot-1968
For many years the citizens of Washington D.C., both black and
white, had told one another that the city was riot-proof. They ration-
alized a major reason being that many black Americans held well-
paying government jobs with good retirement benefits.
Though the spark that ignited the April 1968 riot was the assassi-
nation of Martin Luther King, many prior incidents in 1967 gave sub-
stantial weight to the theory that Washington was becoming less
riot-proof.
When violence did break out, the initial reaction of the police was to
follow Police Chief Layton's policy of restraint. Still, the crowds became
so large and unruly that the police could not control them. Later a
magazine would explain, "Often, in the early hours, outnumbered police
simply stood by-under orders-watching the arson and pillage."28 They
refrained from making arrests, and violence increased. Police in many
areas began to radio for tear gas and help. Where mobs threatened their
lives, they fell back under orders to avoid shooting.29 In some areas, the
looting and fires continued unobserved by the police. Blacks beat whites
on the street; officers riding motorcycles were taken off their vehicles
and assaulted. In still other instances, officers in cruising police vehicles
were good targets for well-aimed bricks and stones. Police using mega-
phones to instruct rioters and bystanders to go home were ignored.
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Police sealed off some sections in the black ghetto."" But this expensive
use of manpower only left other sections of the area open to full scale
looting and burning. Thus, this tactic failed to stop the battle.
Rioting intensified. Mayor Washington declared a curfew, banned all
liquor sales, stationed himself on the scene, and made periodic reports on
television. Even so, the situation became worse. "Mayor Washington
was an eyewitness to looting and vandalism. The mayor had hoped to
convince his fellow blacks to 'cool it'. But a close look at the uncon-
trolled disorder convinced him that he did not have a chance."" It was
not until federal troops were called in that the riot came to a halt.
When the riot ended in Washington, local authorities termed their
policy of restraint a success. After all, only two blacks had been killed by
police, and one of those had died as a result of an accident. Therefore,
we may surmise that the criterion for failure or success of a policy con-
cerning a riot in the "Washington Plan" is judged by how many persons
were killed by police bullets. Should the killing of rioters by police be
the only variable considered when a policy is going to be termed a suc-
cess or failure? It seems that there are other variables to be considered
when such a policy is to be considered a success insofar as its effort to
quell a riot.
In Washington, for example, local authorities found glaring diffi-
culties in three areas while employing this policy: 1) It did not quell
the riot in its infant stages; 2) The local businessmen who owned estab-
lishments in the ravaged area were very unhappy about the way the
police reacted to looting and arson; and 3) The role of the policeman
thoroughly disappointed many members of the Washington Police Force.
In respect to the first issue, this policy did not come even remotely
close to quelling the disturbance in its infant stages. Further evidence
of its failure is significant by the fact that on Friday, April 5, Federal
troops had to be called upon to help quell the riot after the Washington
police lost control of the situation.
The second issue concerns itself with attempts to keep the ghetto
from turning into a "ghost town" when the small and large business
operations pull up stakes for more safety protected areas. Most urban
areas are finding it more and more difficult to keep business operation
from moving away' from the region. Therefore, if the police make little
or no effort to stop rioters from looting and burning business establish-
ments in the ghetto during a riot, such inaction can only serve to infu-
riate an already disgruntled businessman.
Concerning the third issue, it is the author's belief that such policy
did, in fact, lower police morale in Washington. As a result, policemen
felt they were not performing their traditional role as law enforcement
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officers. In reality, they were acting as highly paid observers and, under-
standably, many Washington police voiced their disapproval of this
role. Such policy encourages more breakage of the law by ghetto resi-
dents, for "if they did not try to stop me this time, why should they try
to stop me in the future." To support this type of policy may be to re-
inforce the businessman's fear that this area is not the most advan-
tageous location for the operation of a business.
Therefore, this policy is not as successful as Washington officials would
like us to believe. It did not help to quell the riot in its early stages. On
the contrary, it inflamed men who ran businesses in the area and police-
men who were on the force. This policy in the future may bring about a
higher crime rate that adversely affects the operation of business estab-
lishments in the area. For these reasons, the author finds this type of
policy inadequate as a single measure for the quelling of a riot in its
infant stages.
Comparisons and Conclusions:
The above discussion is based upon a review of literature of seven
race riots which occurred from 1917 to 1968. The review presents con-
clusions in response to the hypothesis that police have been: 1) an ill
organized and ill trained mass which operated under policies that were
unworkable when confronted with civil disturbances; and 2) an or-
ganization that consciously socializes its members in an aura of dis-
criminatory attitudes and behaviors regarding blacks. In a final
analysis of this material, it is advisable to ascertain whether the police
have taken the necessary steps to correct a situation that has been
prominent on the national scene since the beginning of the twentieth
century.
The first segment of this hypothesis dealt with the failure on the
part of the police to adopt certain workable and/or feasible policies
to enable them to channel their resources for far better effectiveness,
gain greater centralization of control over their numbers as well as
define to officers policies that are not ambiguous or self-demeaning.
An illustration of police inadequacies in this area can be seen upon
close observation of the Washington Riot in 1968.
The policy attempting to quell the racially-tense situation in its
early stages was one of complete restraint. It proved unworkable be-
cause it not only tolerated mass looting and arson, but it brought many
of the Washington police force to the conclusion that they were not
to be entrusted with the power to help restrain such actions in their
lawful capacity as peace officers. This policy, therefore, demeaned
the force's morale.
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Further, we have seen the police as being guilty of prejudicial and
discriminatory practices. An excellent illustration of incompetency is
the Chicago Riot of 1919. In this characterization of biased or one
sided law enforcement, a Chicago policeman witnessed the fatal drown-
ing of a young black youth who had been stoned to death by white
ruffians after he had crossed an imaginary line of segregation. The
policeman failed to arrest the white troublemakers and one of the worst
race riots in United States followed.
Given this historical foundation, recommendations can be formu-
lated which may tend to reduce the tendency for history to repeat itself.
Proposed Policy Recommendations
Team Policing for the Ghetto
A major problem in police work has been and continues to be the
tendency of police to create racially-tense situations in various ways.
By creating such circumstances, the police have actively deepened
the racial divisions between themselves and ghetto residents. Today's
problems have grown larger, paralleling the increase in city population
and area. As a result, the police have adjusted the motor patrol to
cover miles of the city's land. Responding to this action, the ghetto
area has experienced a dehumanization of the city's police department.
Very infrequently do these citizens ever see the same officers regularly
in the ghetto area. Correspondingly, the officers dislike being assigned
to the ghetto area because they consider the work to be difficult and
sometimes dangerous.
When these problems of huge urban areas, few effective poli-
cies developed to handle such circumstances and dehumanization of
police, exist together in any large city, racially-tense situations may
occur. Because of these racially-tense situations, there is a deepening
division between the black community and the police.
In an effort to try to curb these problems effectively, the author
suggests the police implement a Team Policing Policy for the ghetto.32
The configuration of this policy can have many forms; the one described
here is just one type of configuration.
To initiate the project, a group specifically chosen for the task
must determine where to divide the ghetto districts to create a number
of more readily accessible small sectors. A predetermined number of
men who have shown a willingness to participate in the program must
then be chosen from within the department's ranks to serve in each
sector. One intelligent and innovative sergeant would command each
group and make all necessary decisions concerning allocation of re-
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cources (including manpower) that the central department would
provide for him. Each sergeant would be held directly responsible for
the complete coordination of his sector.
In such a configuration, the sergeant would also assign a collator
to the car whose specific task would be to synthesize all intelligence
information gathered from his beat and other surrounding beats. He
would place the information in a meaningful order to be presented to
the patrolmen on the beat. Hopefully by such transmission, law en-
forcement would improve. The collator would, then, act as the first
assistant to the sergeant and would get to know the patrolmen and their
capabilities almost as well.
As a result of this operation, six important objects may become
observable:
(1) In effect, this operation may "decentralize" the police force
by making each specific sector a regular identifiable law enforce-
ment body.
(2) If the system is run to its fullest capabilities, certain officers may
take up residence in their sectors in order to facilitate "response
time." Instead of calling downtown to the central office for assist-
ance, the complainant calls these officers at home. They, in turn,
can ring the collator by walkie-talkie, and the collator in turn will
transfer this information to a patrolman on the beat.
(3) It builds up police-community relations because police get to
know the neighborhood better, and the ghetto dweller gets to know
the policeman better as well.
(4) It sensitizes the community to the policeman. In effect, the
community does not see him as being just a symbol-they see him
as a person.
(5) It boosts police morale with a "team" spirit.
(6) There is a definite fixing of responsibility involved making it
difficult for a policeman to shirk his responsibilities.
It can be surmised that through the installation of a Team Policing
Policy the number of racially-tense situations caused by police stand
a good chance of decreasing. This can be concluded because the in-
dividual patrolman who would now regularly be assigned to one sec-
tor will soon realize that the area has certain identifiable problems.
He will find out through active community involvement that there
are feasible ways to handle these difficulties. As a result, racial division
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between the police and the ghetto residents max w ell take a turn for
the better. Such policy implementation aims at halting perceived race
riots before they can occur.
ALModcrate Education, Salary and a Determined Look at th Sociali-
zation Of Recruits in our Present Day Police Forces
It is difficult to estimate how much education and pay affect police
behavior and attitude since few studies have been conducted in this
area." As a result, it is difficult to determine how distinctly these two
variables affect the policeman's attitudes and behaviors while per-
forming his everydax work. Commissions organized after riots have in-
variably emphasized that policemen are not educated enough or paid
appropriately for the job they perform. There is, however, much
merit in an opposing essay by Dr. Burn Levy, the Director of Commun-
ity Services Division, Michigan Civili Rights Commission.
Concurring with Levy, the author agrees that more education and
higher pay for law enforcement officers may not be the answer to
improve police-black relations. Further, it is proposed that huge
sums of money from federal, state, and local governments may be of
little use in trying to achieve better relations.
Recent studies indicate a policeman should have a college educa-
tion or at least exposure to such fields as psychology and sociology
in order to be better qualified for a position on a police force. The
author argues this is unfeasible, uneconomical, and probably unneces-
sary for city governments to hire strictly college graduates for regular
police work. They may not change police attitudes and behaviors for
the improvement of police-black relations. I suggest approaching this
problem from a different perspective-that perspective being a look
at police socialization of its recruits into the system. As Donald J.
MacNamara said,
"The police community is a closed society, and its own customs,
morals, and taboos-and those who are not conforming to the police
society, to its attitudes, to its customs and traditions, taboos and
mores, are ostracized and then excluded . . . whatever prejudices
and discrimination, whatever anti-minority attitudes he (the recruit)
brought in with him, have been tremendously reinforced because
they are part of the community attitudes of this police group of
which he becomes a member.3 4
For this reason, the college graduate may not resolve the problems
he might be recruited to help alleviate. First, the recruit may not possess
any biased or discriminatory feelings toward blacks. However, as a
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result of not identifying with the prevailing attitude, the recruit will
first be ostracized and then excluded from the police society. Secondly,
if the recruit possesses any of these qualities, he is reinforced since these
qualities are dominant attitudes of the group that he now becomes a
part. As a result, a top college graduate stands a good chance of re-
solving few problems. On the contrary, he may act to incite a new
one. In this case, pay is comparable to education in that the salary re-
ceived for services is not dependent upon the quality of service rendered.
The resolution to police-black relations lies in specific policies formu-
lated by the city's police chief-a police chief who is strong enough to
initiate controls over the behavior and attitude of patrolmen in the
ghetto. If this can be accomplished, new recruits can be initiated into
a system condoning bias and discrimination.
Perhaps the need for professional guidelines is indeed an idea whose
time has arrived. The National Institute of Law Enforcement and
Criminal Justice has just published a five volume operational manual
entitled Prevention and Control of Collective Violence." Each volume
presents guidelines structured for a specific organizational unit within
police departments, including the chief of police, the patrol com-
mander, and patrol personnel. Hopefully, this historical analysis of
seven riots and the dismal police reaction thereto will motivate earnest
consideration of recommendations made herein and those of the Na-
tional Institute.
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